a k#d;#@sdZddlZddlmZddlmZddlmZmZm Z ddl m Z m Z m Z ddlmZddlmZmZmZdd lmZdd lmZdd lmZmZmZmZmZdd lmZm Z m!Z!m"Z"m#Z#m$Z$m%Z%m&Z&dd l'm(Z(ddl)m*Z*ddl+m,Z,ddl-m.Z.ddl/m0Z0ddl1m2m3Z3ej4r*ddl)m5Z5ddZ6GdddeeZ7GdddeZ8ddZ9GdddeZ:ddiZ;Gdd d eZd?d@dAdBdCdDdEdF"Z>GdGdHdHeZ?GdIdJdJeZ@eee:dKdLeee:dKdMdS)Nz Common TLS fields & bindings. This module covers the record layer, along with the ChangeCipherSpec, Alert and ApplicationData submessages. For the Handshake type, see tls_handshake.py. See the TLS class documentation for more information. N)conf) log_runtime) ByteEnumFieldPacketListFieldStrField)rawchborb) randstring)RawPadding bind_layers)TCP)_GenericTLSSessionInheritance)_tls_handshake_cls _TLSHandshake_tls13_handshake_clsTLS13ServerHelloTLS13ClientHello)_TLSVersionField _tls_version _TLSIVField _TLSMACField _TLSPadField_TLSPadLenField_TLSLengthField _tls_type) pkcs_i2osp) AEADTagError) Cipher_NULL) CipherError) HMACError)Cipher_CHACHA20_POLY1305cCs|dur dS||kS)z6Returns if version >= min, or False if version == NoneNF)versionminr#r#N/var/www/html/gsl.tools/lib/python3.9/site-packages/scapy/layers/tls/record.py_tls_version_check/sr'c@seZdZdZdZdZdS)_TLSEncryptedContenta~ When the content of a TLS record (more precisely, a TLSCiphertext) could not be deciphered, we use this class to represent the encrypted data. The MAC will still be parsed from the whole message, even though it could not been verified. When present (depending on cipher type and protocol version), the nonce_explicit, IV and/or padding will also be parsed. zEncrypted ContentTN)__name__ __module__ __qualname____doc__nameZmatch_subclassr#r#r#r&r(:sr(csJeZdZdZdfdd ZddZddZd d Zd d Zd dZ Z S)_TLSMsgListFieldz This is the actual content of the TLS record. As a TLS record may pack multiple sublayer messages (notably, several handshake messages), we inherit from PacketListField. Ncs&|s |j}tt|j||d|ddS)N) length_from) _get_lengthsuperr.__init__)selfr-defaultr/ __class__r#r&r2Ms z_TLSMsgListField.__init__cCs|jdur|jS|jSN)deciphered_lenlen)r3pktr#r#r&r0Ss z_TLSMsgListField._get_lengthcCst}|jdkrft|dkrt|d}|jjdkr>|jjdusJ|jjdkrXt|t}qt |t}n.|jdkrvt }n|jdkrt }n|jdkrt }|turt|Sz|||jd WSt ytjrʂt|YS0dS) z Try to parse one of the TLS subprotocols (ccs, alert, handshake or application_data). This is used inside a loop managed by .getfield(). rN) tls_session)r typer9r rAadvertised_tls_version tls_versionrgetrTLSChangeCipherSpecTLSAlertTLSApplicationData ExceptionrZdebug_dissector)r3r:mclsmsgtyper#r#r&m2iXs2          z_TLSMsgListField.m2ic Cs\||}g}d}|}|dur8|d|||d}}|dkr|jjpJddkrtt|drt|jdkrt|tddgfSt|dr|jdkr|tgfS|tdd gfSd t |jj j j vr|t |fS|rL|}|||}t|vr|t} | j}| j`t|d kr |dt| }nd}t|tr@|jjs@||||q|||fSdS) a If the decryption of the content did not fail with a CipherError, we begin a loop on the clear content in order to get as much messages as possible, of the type advertised in the record header. This is notably important for several TLS handshake implementations, which may for instance pack a server_hello, a certificate, a server_key_exchange and a server_hello_done, all in one record. Each parsed message may update the TLS context through their method .post_dissection_tls_session_update(). If the decryption failed with a CipherError, presumably because we missed the session keys, we signal it by returning a _TLSEncryptedContent packet which simply contains the ciphered data. NirBr@)datar>)loadFr)r/rArDhasattrrBrHrFr six itervaluesrcscipherreadyr(rMr rQZ underlayerpayloadr9 isinstancerfrozen"post_dissection_tls_session_updateappend) r3r:stmp_lenlstretZremainZraw_msgppadr#r#r&getfieldsB         z_TLSMsgListField.getfieldcCsd}t|tr|jdur^t|tr*d|_n4t|trr?r;r@) rYrrBrFrGrrHrArZZ raw_statefulpost_build_tls_session_updater)r3r:racurr#r#r&i2ms&        z_TLSMsgListField.i2mcCsd}|D]}||||7}qt|trnt|jjdrnt|jdtsnt|jdtsnt|jdt sn||S|j szd|_ t d|j |dd}||S)zv Reconstruct the header because the TLS type may have been updated. Then, append the content. rNr=rz!Br<) rfrYrr'rArDmsgrrrFrBstructpack)r3r:r]valresrahdrr#r#r&addfields"  z_TLSMsgListField.addfield)N) r)r*r+r,r2r0rMrcrfrn __classcell__r#r#r5r&r.Fs(5r.cCsDt|dkrdSddlm}t|dddkoBt|dd|vS)zN This is a copycat of wireshark's `packet-tls.c` ssl_looks_like_sslv2 Nr)_sslv2_handshake_typer<)r9Z scapy.layers.tls.handshake_sslv2rqord)Zdatrqr#r#r&_ssl_looks_like_sslv2s  ruc seZdZdZdgZdZeddeedde e dde dde dge d ded ded dgZfd d Zed,ddZddZddZddZddZddZddZddZddZd d!Zd"d#Zd$d%Zd&d'Zd(d)Z fd*d+Z!Z"S)-TLSa9 The generic TLS Record message, based on section 6.2 of RFC 5246. When reading a TLS message, we try to parse as much as we can. In .pre_dissect(), according to the type of the current cipher algorithm (self.tls_session.rcs.cipher.type), we extract the 'iv', 'mac', 'pad' and 'padlen'. Some of these fields may remain blank: for instance, when using a stream cipher, there is no IV nor any padding. The 'len' should always hold the length of the ciphered message; for the plaintext version, you should rely on the additional 'deciphered_len' attribute. XXX Fix 'deciphered_len' which should not be defined when failing with AEAD decryption. This is related to the 'decryption_success' below. Also, follow this behaviour in record_sslv2.py and record_tls13.py Once we have isolated the ciphered message aggregate (which should be one or several TLS messages of the same type), we try to decipher it. Either we succeed and store the clear data in 'msg', or we graciously fail with a CipherError and store the ciphered data in 'msg'. Unless the user manually provides the session secrets through the passing of a 'tls_session', obviously the ciphered messages will not be deciphered. Indeed, the need for a proper context may also present itself when trying to parse clear handshake messages. For instance, suppose you sniffed the beginning of a DHE-RSA negotiation:: t1 = TLS() t2 = TLS() t3 = TLS(, tls_session=t1.tls_session) (Note that to do things properly, here 't1.tls_session' should actually be 't1.tls_session.mirror()'. See session.py for explanations.) As no context was passed to t2, neither was any client_random. Hence Scapy will not be able to verify the signature of the server_key_exchange inside t2. However, it should be able to do so for t3, thanks to the tls_session. The consequence of not having a complete TLS context is even more obvious when trying to parse ciphered content, as we described before. Thus, in order to parse TLS-protected communications with Scapy: _either Scapy reads every message from one side of the TLS connection and builds every message from the other side (as such, it should know the secrets needed for the generation of the pre_master_secret), while passing the same tls_session context (this is how our automaton.py mostly works); _or, if Scapy did not build any TLS message, it has to create a TLS context and feed it with secrets retrieved by whatever technique. Note that the knowing the private key of the server certificate will not be sufficient if a PFS ciphersuite was used. However, if you got a master_secret somehow, use it with tls_session.(w|r)cs.derive_keys() and leave the rest to Scapy. When building a TLS message with raw_stateful, we expect the tls_session to have the right parameters for ciphering. Else, .post_build() might fail. r8rBNr$r9ivrhmacrbpadlencs(|dd|_tt|j|i|dS)Nr8)rEr8r1rvr2)r3argskargsr5r#r&r26sz TLS.__init__c Os|durt|}|dkrtd|dd\}}|dd}|tvsL|dkr|rd|jdksz|jdkszt|r|rz|jdurddlm }|St S|rt |jdrd d } | |j s| |j r|d krdd lm} | S|d krt StS)au If the TLS class was called on raw SSLv2 data, we want to return an SSLv2 record instance. We acknowledge the risk of SSLv2 packets with a msglen of 0x1403, 0x1503, 0x1603 or 0x1703 which will never be casted as SSLv2 records but TLS ones instead, but hey, we can't be held responsible for low-minded extensibility choices. NrsBBrArpr)SSLv2r=cSs|ot|jt Sr7)rYrVr)xr#r#r&Vsz#TLS.dispatch_hook..r@)TLS13rg)r9riunpackrErrDrCruZscapy.layers.tls.record_sslv2r}r(r'rUprcsZscapy.layers.tls.record_tls13rrv) rKZ_pktrzr{plenZbyte0Zbyte1r]r}Z _has_cipherrr#r#r& dispatch_hook:s8    zTLS.dispatch_hookc CszJtd|jjj}|jjjd7_||dd}|jjj|||WStyt}z|jWYd}~Sd}~0t y}z*| }t d||jWYd}~Sd}~00dS)a Provided with the record header and AEAD-ciphered data, return the sliced and clear tuple (nonce, TLSCompressed.fragment, mac). Note that we still return the slicing of the original input in case of decryption failure. Also, if the integrity check fails, a warning will be issued, but we still return the sliced (unauthenticated) plaintext. !Qr<Nrp'TLS: record integrity check failed [%s])rirjrArUseq_numrVZ auth_decryptr rzr firstlayersummaryrinfo)r3rmr] read_seq_numadd_dataepkt_infor#r#r&_tls_auth_decryptes  zTLS._tls_auth_decryptcCs|jjj|S)ab Provided with stream- or block-ciphered data, return the clear version. The cipher should have been updated with the right IV early on, which should not be at the beginning of the input. In case of decryption failure, a CipherError will be raised with the slicing of the original input as first argument. )rArUrVZdecryptr3r]r#r#r& _tls_decrypt}szTLS._tls_decryptc Cstd|jjj}|jjjd7_|jjj}|dkr:dSt||krJdS|jjj}td|ddd}zX|dkr| |||}n8|dkr| ||d d|dd |}nt d Wnt y|}Yn0||kS) a Provided with the record header, the TLSCompressed.fragment and the HMAC, return True if the HMAC is correct. If we could not compute the HMAC because the key was missing, there is no sense in verifying anything, thus we also return True. Meant to be used with a block cipher or a stream cipher. It would fail with an AEAD cipher, because rcs.hmac would be None. See RFC 5246, section 6.2.3. rr<rTF!HrpNrgUnrecognized version.) rirjrArUrmac_lenr9hmacrdigest digest_sslv3rIr!) r3rmrhrxrralgr$hr#r#r&_tls_hmac_verifys$    (   zTLS._tls_hmac_verifycCs|jjj}||S)ze Provided with the TLSCompressed.fragment, return the TLSPlaintext.fragment. )rArU compression decompressr3r]rr#r#r&_tls_decompresss zTLS._tls_decompressc st|dkrtdtd|ddd}|dd|dd|||dd}}}d}}}d_d} jjjj} fd d } fd d } | d krtd|ddd} jj r| |\}}| |||zV| dkr"jjjj }|d|||d}}|jjj_ |}n |}Wn0t y^}z|jd}WYd}~njd}~00d} t|dd}|d| || d}}|_jj r|}n| |\}}| |||n| dkr*z |}Wn0t y }z|jd}WYd}~n&d}~00d} | |\}}| |||nP| dkrztjrdtjjjtrdd}||\}}n||\}}}d} |}| rt|_nd_||||}|||S)a7 Decrypt, verify and decompress the message, i.e. apply the previous methods according to the reading cipher type. If the decryption was successful, 'len' will be the length of the TLSPlaintext.fragment. Else, it should be the length of the _TLSEncryptedContent. rgz$Invalid record: header is too short.rrprNrNFcsDjjj}|dkr2|d| || d}}n |d}}||fS)z Extract MAC.rNrN)rArUr)rPr^fragrxr3r#r& extract_macs    z$TLS.pre_dissect..extract_maccsJ|ddtdt|}|||}|sF}td|dS)zVerify integrity.Nrprr)rirjr9rrrrr)rmcfragrxZchdrZ is_mac_okrrr#r& verify_macs z#TLS.pre_dissect..verify_macblockr<Tstreamaead)r9rIrirryrArUrVrBencrypt_then_mac block_sizerwrr rzr rcrypto_valid_advancedrYr"rrr8)r3r]ZmsglenrmefragrrwrxrbZdecryption_success cipher_typerrr$rpfragrrrymfragrZreconstructed_bodyr#rr& pre_dissectsl 0                  zTLS.pre_dissectcCsx|jjrt|jjdkrt|jjrD|jjdur<|jj|j_d|j_d|j_|jjrt|jjdurl|jj|j_d|j_d|j_|S)a1 Commit the pending r/w state if it has been triggered (e.g. by an underlying TLSChangeCipherSpec or a SSLv2ClientMasterKey). We update nothing if the prcs was not set, as this probably means that we're working out-of-context (and we need to keep the default rcs). rONF)rArDtriggered_prcs_commitrrUtriggered_pwcs_commitpwcswcsrr#r#r& post_dissect's     zTLS.post_dissectcCs^|rZzt|d||jd}Wn4ty.Yn"tyNtj|d|d}Yn0||dS)z Try to dissect the following data as a TLS message. Note that overloading .guess_payload_class() would not be enough, as the TLS session to be used would get lost. r<) _internal _underlayerrA)rrN)rvrAKeyboardInterruptrIrZ raw_layerZ add_payload)r3r]rar#r#r&do_dissect_payload<s   zTLS.do_dissect_payloadcCs|jjj}||S)ze Provided with the TLSPlaintext.fragment, return the TLSCompressed.fragment. )rArrcompressrr#r#r& _tls_compressNs zTLS._tls_compresscCsbtd|jjj}|jjjd7_|t|jdt|jdtt|d}|jjj |||S)z Return the TLSCiphertext.fragment for AEAD ciphers, i.e. the whole GenericAEADCipher. Also, the additional data is computed right here. rr<rs) rirjrArrrrBr$r9rVZ auth_encrypt)r3r] write_seq_numrr#r#r&_tls_auth_encryptVs   zTLS._tls_auth_encryptcCstd|jjj}|jjjd7_|jjj}td|ddd}|dkrb||||}n8|dkr|||dd|dd|}nt d ||S) a Provided with the record header (concatenation of the TLSCompressed type, version and length fields) and the TLSCompressed.fragment, return the concatenation of the TLSCompressed.fragment and the HMAC. Meant to be used with a block cipher or a stream cipher. It would fail with an AEAD cipher, because wcs.hmac would be None. See RFC 5246, section 6.2.3. rr<rrprrNrgr) rirjrArrrrrrrI)r3rmrhrrr$rr#r#r& _tls_hmac_addds  (zTLS._tls_hmac_addcCsLd}|jjjj}|t|d|}||kr0d}t|}||d}||S)a Provided with the concatenation of the TLSCompressed.fragment and the HMAC, append the right padding and return it as a whole. This is the TLS-style padding: while SSL allowed for random padding, TLS (misguidedly) specifies the repetition of the same byte all over, and this byte must be equal to len() - 1. Meant to be used with a block cipher only. rNr<r)rArrVrr9r)r3r]paddingrryZ pad_patternr#r#r&_tls_pad{s   z TLS._tls_padcCs|jjj|S)z Return the stream- or block-ciphered version of the concatenated input. In case of GenericBlockCipher, no IV has been specifically prepended to the output, so this might not be the whole TLSCiphertext.fragment yet. )rArrVZencryptrr#r#r& _tls_encryptszTLS._tls_encryptc Cs|dd|dd}}t|}|ddtd|}||}t|}|ddtd|}|jjjj}|dkr|jjs| ||}| |}|j dkr|jjjj }t |} | |jjj_||} | | } n ||} |jjr| || } n6|dkr| ||} || } n|dkr*||} |jdurR|ddtd|j}n|ddtdt| }|jjr|jjdur|jj|j_d|j_d |j_|| |S) zR Apply the previous methods according to the writing cipher type. NrgrprrrrrF)r9rirjrrArrVrBrrrr$rr rwrrrr) r3r:Zpayrmrr^rrrrwrrr#r#r& post_buildsD                 zTLS.post_buildcs:tt|}|jr6|d7}|ddd|jD7}|S)Nz / css|]}t|d|jVqdS)_nameN)getattrr-).0r~r#r#r& rNz TLS.mysummary..)r1rv mysummaryrhjoinrr5r#r&rs z TLS.mysummary)N)#r)r*r+r, __slots__r-rrrrrrr.rrr fields_descr2 classmethodrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrror#r#r5r&rvs:7    * !wKrvr<Zchange_cipher_specc@s2eZdZdZdZeddegZddZddZ d S) rFz Note that, as they are not handshake messages, the ccs messages do not get appended to the list of messages whose integrity gets verified through the Finished messages. zTLS ChangeCipherSpecrLr<cCs d|j_dSNT)rArr3Zmsg_strr#r#r&r[sz6TLSChangeCipherSpec.post_dissection_tls_session_updatecCs d|j_dSr)rArrr#r#r&rdsz1TLSChangeCipherSpec.post_build_tls_session_updateN) r)r*r+r,r-r_tls_changecipherspec_typerr[rdr#r#r#r&rFs rFwarningfatal)r<rsZ close_notifyZunexpected_messageZbad_record_macZdecryption_failedZrecord_overflowZdecompression_failureZhandshake_failureZno_certificate_RESERVEDZbad_certificateZunsupported_certificateZcertificate_revokedZcertificate_expiredZcertificate_unknownZillegal_parameterZ unknown_caZ access_deniedZ decode_errorZ decrypt_errorZexport_restriction_RESERVEDZprotocol_versionZinsufficient_securityZinternal_errorZinappropriate_fallbackZ user_canceledZno_renegotiationZmissing_extensionZunsupported_extensionZcertificate_unobtainableZunrecognized_nameZbad_certificate_status_responseZbad_certificate_hash_valueZunknown_psk_identityZcertificate_requiredZno_application_protocol)"r r>r?r;()*+,-./0123<FGPVZdmnopqrstxc@s@eZdZdZeddeeddegZddZddZ d d Z dS) rGz TLS AlertlevelNdescrcCs |dS)NzAlert %level%: %descr%)Zsprintfrr#r#r&r"szTLSAlert.mysummarycCsdSr7r#rr#r#r&r[%sz+TLSAlert.post_dissection_tls_session_updatecCsdSr7r#rr#r#r&rd(sz&TLSAlert.post_build_tls_session_update) r)r*r+r-r_tls_alert_level_tls_alert_descriptionrrr[rdr#r#r#r&rGs  rGc@s,eZdZdZeddgZddZddZdS) rHzTLS Application DatarPcCsdSr7r#rr#r#r&r[4sz5TLSApplicationData.post_dissection_tls_session_updatecCsdSr7r#rr#r#r&rd7sz0TLSApplicationData.post_build_tls_session_updateN)r)r*r+r-rrr[rdr#r#r#r&rH0s rHi)Zsport)dport)Ar,riZ scapy.configrZ scapy.errorrZ scapy.fieldsrrrZ scapy.compatrrr Z scapy.utilsr Z scapy.packetr r r Zscapy.layers.inetrZscapy.layers.tls.sessionrZscapy.layers.tls.handshakerrrrrZscapy.layers.tls.basefieldsrrrrrrrrZscapy.layers.tls.crypto.pkcs1rZ#scapy.layers.tls.crypto.cipher_aeadrZ%scapy.layers.tls.crypto.cipher_streamrZscapy.layers.tls.crypto.commonr Zscapy.layers.tls.crypto.h_macr!Zscapy.libs.sixZlibsrSrr"r'r(r.rurvrrFrrrGrHr#r#r#r& sj      (        $ }